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QUEUEING OR CREAMING? WIIl OR LOSE
Neil A. Cohen, Ph.D.
University of Louisville
Kent School of Social Work
ABSTRACT
A review of the Work Incentive Program (WIN) provides
insight into some of the issues and options confronting man-
power planners and administrators. It becomes apparent that
the strategies regularly utilized and reinforced by federal
funding practices can clearly be labelled as "creaming."
The "queueing" model is presented as an alternative decision-
making process that appears more likely to lead to rational
and purposive outcomes for manpower programs.
CREAMING
Creaming procedures are those strategies that select the
"most workable" and "most readily placeable" candidates from
among a pool for entry into a placement system while the least
workable and most troublesome candidates are relegated to a
"hold" position--in short, the "cream" is selected, or skimmed
from the top.
S.M. Miller et allargue that efforts to improve the
condition of those at the top of the bottom strata of society
(hard-core unemployed would be included as people living in
chronic poverty), often leave the bottom-most untouched, and
in terms of relative deprivation, worse off than before.
Seven years of experience within the public welfare system
in California and a two year examination of the WIN Program in
three mid-western states, indicate that the major decision-
making process is "creaming," and is inappropriate to the pro-
gram goals, i.e., the movement of the hard-core disadvantaged,
The writer wishes to gratefully acknowledge the assistance of,
David Gochman, Ph.D., Kent School of Social Work, University of
Louisville, for critiquing earlier drafts of this paper.
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suffering from chronic, structural unemployment, into gainful
jobs. "Creaming" procedures in the delivery of services,
result in the poorest being the most likely to be excluded or
left behind at each of the four steps through which they must
successfully pass:
1. Presentation
a) Who is notified of the program?
b) What impression does the program make on its audience?
c) Is the program or service accessible to people who find
it appealing and would like to participate in it?
2. Admission
a) What happens to people who apply for a service or
program?
b) How do agencies treat them?
3. Completion
a) Who completes a program?
b) What is involved in their completing it?
c) Completion of a program is conditioned by the effort a
person must expend to remain in a program, the willing-
ness of the agency to keep him, the continuation of
the program itself, and the amount of benefit he believes
he is receiving or will receive from the program train-
ing.
4. Aftermath
a) Does anyone benefit from the services?
b) If so, who?
c) How lasting is their benefit?
d) Does the improvement in the individual's life help him
obtain other benefits for himself or others?
Creaming results from a set of related factors: One of these
is the relative ease of assimilating into a system those new
persons that are similar to persons already in the system.
Another is the heightened uniformity, efficiency, and productivity
that results from such similarity. Third, as Miller3 suggests:
"exclusion of persons less socialized to middle-class styles and
current agency practices allows older institutions to avoid large-
scale changes; those most amenable to existing programs are chosen
or asked to participate."
"Creaming can also serve to maintain the status quo of the
larger society. It co-opts the potential or actual leader of
the poor and leaves untouched those poor who may be too miserable
to pressure for change."
Thus, by including only the ipwardly mobile poor, a social
welfare program is more likely to have "success." The Lelf-
fulfilling prophecy for some social service agencies of creat-
ing an impressive track record, getting additional funds as a
result, and utilizing these monies to create a yet more impres-
sive "success" story, is a reality.
Unfortunately for the hard-core unemployed, that portion
of reality which is often overlooked, is what becomes of them
after completing a manpower program. Too often, the ability to
procure additional and larger private and federal grants becomes
an end in itself, and the means to these monies, the enrollees,
are manipulated in accordance with creaming strategies. 5
Thus, many manpower programs are confronted with conflict-
ing objectives. Their efforts to reduce risk, to establish a
successful performance record based on placing on jobs the
"easiest to place," and to help those most likely to succeed
who don't need the benefit of assistance, all combine to work
against the objective of providing meaningful, useful services
for the hard-core unemployed.
In a recent study of decision-making in the WIN Program,
6
it was discovered that in two years the Department of Labor
created more jobs for the members of the research team (staff
of four) than it did for the entire WIN operation in that Mid-
west City. Only one welfare recipient was placed on a job
through the WIN Program in 24 months!
Creaming is a particularly successful program strategy
when the economy provides fewer jobs than there are people
actively seeking employment. The staffs of job-training, job-
development, and job-placement programs are thus encouraged
to be quite selective in whom they choose to prepare (educate,
train, refer, orient) for future employment. Those who are
not the most desirable, nor easily worked with, are processed,
promised, and placed in such WIN Program components as admini-
strative "hold," job-ready "hold," and between-program "hold."
The creaming process thus has a disturbing and debilitating
effect on the enrollee especially on males. Many enrollees drop
out of the program or merely go through the motions of partici-
pating. For the majority of people who enroll in the WIN prom-an
with the expectation of a job and don't get one, the experience
reinforces the cycle of bitterness, disappointment, failure,
frustration, and alienation.
In spite of federal policy and regulations to the contrary,
staffs continue to make intuitive selection of the seemingly
"best" enrollees (easiest to work with, good work history, educa-
tion, high motivation). This particularistic approach is supported
implicitly by administrators who are pressured into maintaining
fiscally sound production records: records which aim at process
and body counts, not significant outcomes for the enrollees. The
most disadvantaged among the unemployed (the "untouchables") thus
fall further into the hold "cul de sacs" of the bureaucratic maze,
while those who would eventually get jobs on their own anyway,
are credited as job placements for the WIN program. Those enrol-
lees who pose the greatest challenge, and for whom the WIN program,
and other Great Society programs were ostensibly designed, those
virtually disenfranchised members of society characterized by
poor work history, little education, and lack of job skills--the
hard-core unemployed or under-employed, fall further toward the
bottom of the barrel.
The practice of creaming represents a barrier to the maximum
utilization of our human resources. Not only are the chronically
underemployed and unemployed exploited and left to fall further
out of the economic mainstream, they are manipulated to provide
a hedge against higher wage, better working conditions for the
regularly employed and ultimately a hedge for higher corporation
profits. 7
According to Richan,8 "for decades, relief programs had the
function of maintaining a pool of low-skilled labor at subsistence
levels, low enough to make low-paying jobs in private industry
attractive. This surplus of cheap labor provided an important
cushion for the u s and downs of the labor market." Similarly,
Cloward and Piven point out that relief arrangements are ancil-
lary to economic arrangements.
Their chief function is to regulate labor and they do that
in two general ways. First, when mass unemployment leads
to outbreaks of turmoil, relief programs are ordinarily
initiated or expanded to absorb and control enough of the
unemployed to restore order; then as turbulence subsides,
the relief system contracts, expelling those who are needed
to populate the labor market.
As Richanl 0indicates, "work and training, or Title V or
the Concentrated Employment Program (CEP) or WIN, is an euphemism
for a system that holds some welfare recipients on a treadmill
and siphons others into jobs which cannot attract workers from
the regular labor force."
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QUEUEING
If a social policy proposal is to have any salience and
impact, it must be offered in the context of existing realities.
Among these realities is legislation which embodies existing
corporate interests--the big-business, private sector, free
enterprise ideology which characterizes the economic system in
this country. The Queueing Model does not and can not change
the ideological underpinnings of our economic system.
A Queueing model of decision-making is proposed that could
maximize the congruence between the client-need and server-
resource mix in the WIN manpower program. This model is sug-
gested as an alternative to the present particularistic match-
ing and selection creaming procedures used by WIN.
Queueing theory is a mathematical approach to the problem
of estimating the relationship between the amount of time which
incoming items (consumers) will wait in a queue in terms of:
a. The arrival time distribution (i.e., the distribution
of the time between successive arrivals in the queue);
b. The pattern of service times; and
c. The number of service points.
A critical problem of many human service programs, especial-
ly those operating as WIN does on a large volume basis, is the
slippage, or idle time that characterizes the consumer's move-
ment through the system. In business sectors, this would be
described as "down-time," a situation which has dire consequences
for those concerned with profit and loss. Down-time, or waiting
periods, also having invidious implication for job-training
enrollees as well as for the WIN program workers and administra-
tors.
According to operations research theory, the objectives
of service are to balance the demand for service with the
capacity of the server, to minimize the costs of waiting for
services (consumers) and the idle time of the server facility
(WIN program). This presents a queueing problem when the
demand rate (requests for job training, and/or jobs) and the
amount of service available (counselling, job development, GED,
work experience, on-the-job training, job placement) are incon-
gruent and when there are costs (loss of federal funding, cut-
backs in program, political concern, tax-payer dissatisfaction,
consumer dissatisfaction, unrest in the streets) associated
with waiting time of consumers and the idle time of the service
facility.
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Thus, three critical issues are:
a. The cost of waiting time or idleness to the consumer
(this can be a psychological, social, physical, as
well as economic cost);
b. The costs of down-time or idle time to a public agency;
c. The degree to which the amount of services available is
subject to control.
Waiting, or idleness, is a cost to the consumer, not only in
a monetary sense, but also as psychosocial cost. To be "cooled
out," has definite negative consequence for the person such as
unrealized heightened expectation, erosion of trust and credibility,
frustration, anger and alienation. In addition, time spent in a
manpower program often prevents many enrollees, especially street-
corner men, from maintaining important community-based social
contacts. It is also a cost to the consumer if he received a
poor return on his investment (in this case his time and himself
as human capital) e.g. a classroom opening, a training site, a
job that never materializes.
"Down-time" is also a cost to the WIN program. If a public
bureaucracy, such as WIN, strives for nothing else, it does
concern itself about internal operations, and with accountability
and efficiency. Slippage in the program erodes WIN production
and impairs staff morale. Furthermore, and possibly more critical,
idleness, or waiting time, prevents the program from satisfying
its public charge: i.e., to facilitate the entry of recipients
of AFDC into jobs that paid a living wage.
Although WIN cannot directly control the number of jobs
available in the community, it does have control over the man-
power-related supportive service vendors in the community by
virtue of the federal subsidies it can pay them. WIN always
has some control through its job development program; it can
help shape the nature of jobs by the emphasis staff places on
developing and consolidating job patterns in the community.
WIN, as with other public programs, is paying increasing
attention to the pursuit of efficiency, accountability, and
sound business management principles and techniques; its
rationale being that efficiency of operation will enhance
the program's effectiveness. A critical decision which any
organization (even a non-profit, tax supported program such as
WIN) must make is the selection of a single best course of action
for the achievement of long range goals.
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Cohen and Cyertllsuggest that the only choice that nust ! c
made it a given point of time (such as when enrollees first come
to the W11 program) and which cannot be postponed is the choie
of the first move.
It follows from Cohen and Cyort that the proper concern of
WIN operations is "determination and enforcement of the first-
move component belonging to the optimal course of actioD over
the firm's (or agency's) entire perspective history."
12
Presently, WIN follows a riro (first in--first out) processing
procedure. Enrollees are processed on a first-come, first-serve
basis. Usually, enrollees are placed in the first WIN program
component opening that becomes available.
Queueing, in contrast to creaming, stresses the long-term
importance of the first decision. That is, if an enrollee were
carefully assessed at the outset as to what his interests, back-
ground, motivation, and abilities were; the first program place-
ment would be calculated on the basis of what this would mean to
the enrollee in the long run. Present short run manipulations
of enrollees would be replaced by a strategy that would be
sensitive to both anticipated and unanticipated outcomes of the
program placement.
An example of this might be placing a heavy equipment
operator in a baking school, not because he is interested nor
skilled in baking, but because he and the position are simul-
taneously available. Further planning, including use of pro-
jected manpower needs, might have revealed that what would have
been most productive for our hypothetical heavy equipment
operator, would have been sending him for on-the-job training
for additional skills in the use of heavy equipment, while
awaiting the opening of appropriate positions.
Moreover, the Queueing model facilitates reaching the
"hard to place" simply by reducing the amount of time staff
needs to work with the "cream"--who are generally not as much
in need of services anyway.
In addition, systematic rather than intuitive processing
will yield valuable information for the development of train-
ing programs, jobs and future planning.
rurthermore, rational placement procedures would assist in
revealing those enrollees who require help in extricating
themselves from the world of work since they are physically,
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mentally or emotionally unfit, or help in providing some type of
sheltered, protective, semi or non-competitive work environment.
Also, there is a group of enrollees who with additional staff
services, might be able to bridge the gap of heretofore unem-
ployable or underemployable status, to that of being job ready.
Queueing will not replace Creaming until there are policy
and program supports which reward outcomes that benefit the
enrollee as well as provide incentives for program staff to work
with the hard-to-reach. Because increased number counts often
become translated into "success" by federal monitors of the
WIN program, local administrators will not be motivated toward
implementing the Queueing model until different evaluation
criteria are instituted.
To encourage the implementation of a Queueing model of
decision making, program "success" criteria needs to be
revised to reflect the quality of placements, with a set of
weighting factors being assigned to placements of varying
difficulty. The difficulty factor would be considered in the
production records of the human service workers--no longer
would amount of activity be the sole criterion of evaluation;
rather, the nature and quality of the activities and the
difficulty factor regarding placements would be reflected in
the monthly and quarterly audit reports.
For example, placement of enrollee A (he has had a good
employment history--the "cream") onto a job might be assigned a
difficulty factor of .3. Placement of a hard-to place enrolee
B into a training class might be assigned a .5 weighting factor.
Placement of enrollee B into a job with good probability of
future potential might be assigned an .8 weighting. In brief,
explicit recognition of the quality of the performance would
facilitate staff spending additional time and effort with
more difficult problem situation, thus providing an incentive
for careful deliberation at the outset--the importance of the
first move (Queueing).
CONCLUSION
A prime index of the worth of any manpower program is its
ability to place people in jobs. The effectiveness of manpower
programs, however, is limited by any larger social policy which
restricts the opportunities for full employment and jobs which
offer dignity and a decent wage. A queueing model cannot provide
these opportunities, but it can provide an alternative to the
present method of exacerbating the already-existing schism
between the haves and the have-nots--even among the heterogeneous
poor.
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Queueing is a rational approach to decision-making in a
human services program--whereby government, local WIN administra-
tion, staff, and most importantly, the consumers, can benefit
from the increased probability of better services accruing
from a publically funded program.
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